Difference

Naeem Inayatullah and David Blaney argue very persuasively that IR needs to address, rather than continue to defer, the problem of difference. What has perhaps struck me most is the way they ground the problem in some of the debates (read: wars) that took place in pre-Westphalia Europe--mainly those surrounding Christianity. That there were, according to the authors, multiple layers of the problem of difference (ie. horizontal, vertical, between continents, within theological schools) is fascinating.

I am a bit ashamed to say that I hadn't really thought of religion through the lens of difference before, but it makes a lot of sense. In the three Abrahamic religions, the notion of difference is central, both to understanding religious practice and, most importantly, to understanding the notion of salvation. There are Jews and Gentiles. There are Christians and non-Christians. There is Dar al-Islam and Dar al-Harb. The 'problem' of difference is inherent in these religions as currently and historically understood, and being 'different' from the norm carries dire eternal consequences.

Also interesting is that the Abrahamic faiths exhibit what could be viewed as a "vertical" difference. Muslims believe that Muhammad received the final, most complete revelation of God's message, built on (most of) the revelations of Judaism and Christianity. Christians believe that God has been more fully revealed in Jesus, augmenting the knowledge of God provided by the Old Testament. There is, depending upon where one is placed, a very definite notion of 'progress' from Judaism to Christianity to Islam, though not all things are kept as the faith 'progresses'.

There is also, as the authors reference with regard to the splits within Calvinism (pp. 73-80), the notion of difference within religions. This is perhaps what is most disheartening about The Thirty Years' War and all subsequent violent action between Catholics and Protestants--they both descend from the Christian faith. They both ostensibly believe that Jesus is the Son of God, sent to Earth to take away the sins of all those who would believe by Grace. Without getting into bits of theological minutiae, I would argue that internal difference within Christianity , though bellicose actions would seem to betray my argument, are much less eternally significant, to Christians, than inside/outside difference. The same could be said of the internal difference within Islam between Sunnis and Shi'a, playing itself out so horrifically in Iraq. I understand that there are differences of practice, theology, and so on, but it is extremely disheartening to see internal difference take on such a violent character.*

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*This is not to say that violence based on inside/outside difference is any better, it just seems more understandable, if I may use that word, than violence based on internal difference.

Walzer post-class

Just and Unjust Wars is, in a lot of ways, a tough nut to crack. As we discussed in class on Thursday, one can't really argue against it, there's sparse use of formal logic, and Walzer basically says, "if you disagree, well then maybe this book isn't for you--we live in different worlds." It was much easier to digest authors like Rousseau and Kant who used foundational considerations of reason as defense for their argument. As Jesse points out, Walzer's sometimes feels like a "because I said so" kind of argument.

It's a little bit disconcerting to read on p. 107 that "Humanitarian intervention is justified when it is a response (with reasonable expectations of success) to acts 'that shock the moral conscience of mankind,'" wonder what precisely is meant by "reasonable expectations of success" and "shock the moral conscience" and "mankind," and realize that Walzer is pretty okay with the ambiguity of those notions. This infuriates part of me--I think it's important to know what those things mean in order to set up parameters for how war is to be justly begun and executed. Though Hobbes presents, in some ways, a much less palatable argument, one is much more clear about (most of) his definitional notions.

Similarly, if Walzer and those who would want to argue with him are simply talking past each other, why is this book so popular that it is in its 4th edition (printed in Aug '06 with new discussions about the Iraq War)? I would argue that, as we discussed in class, Walzer is touching on something perennial, and that there's still a 'gut feeling' that Walzer is on to something. I was approached by a half-dozen separate people on the Metro while reading this book. All seemed to think that discussions of just and unjust war were important. Even though some of the argumentation techniques employed are similar (albeit much more effective) to those found in some political tracts, one finds it more palatable because there is a need for this kind of thinking (about jus ad bellum and jus in bello) in modern debates (as opposed to some of the nonsense that is printed in the name of 'sound political debate').

Ultimately, I think, it comes down to that 'gut feeling' that Walzer has, specific qualms aside, made a pretty decent point.


N.B. - Christine makes a good point about the absence of talk about jus post bellum.