Walzer pre-class
In light of the perennial contemporary debate over the 2003 invasion of Iraq by the U.S. military, chapters 5 & 6 (on anticipation and intervention respectively) provide for interesting reflection.
The first thing that strikes me is Walzer's distinction between prevention and pre-emption (see also: Gaddis, Surprise, Security, and the American Experience (2004)). For Walzer, the difference lies in the imminence of an enemy's capability to attack and disrupt--preventive wars are fought to prevent a state from achieving the capabilities to attack in the future, pre-emptive wars are fought to disrupt an imminent attack. He argues (p. 80) that 'merely' preventive wars are unjustified, but that pre-emptive wars might be (depending on how "sufficient" the threat is [p. 81]).
So the question then becomes, "How do we characterize the 2003 invasion--as a preventive or pre-emptive war?" Most people/practitioners/scholars (Walzer included) would likely argue that it was preventive--Iraq didn't have imminent attack capabilities. The Bush administration argued, and still does/would, that the threat was much more imminent, and that it was thus a pre-emptive strike. The administration would argue that Iraq fit into Walzer's three criteria that satisfy a "sufficient threat,", namely "a manifest intent to injure, a degree of active preparation that makes that intent a positive danger, and a general situation in which waiting, or doing anything other than fighting, greatly magnifies the risk" (81).
What is particularly interesting to me is that, over the course of the three-year U.S. occupation [sic] of Iraq, and particularly in light of the fact that no WMD have been found, the Bush administration's primary justification for the invasion has shifted from pre-emption to intervention. The (nearly exclusive) line now is, "We needed to intervene to dethrone that horrible tyrant and establish democracy in Iraq." They are arguing on humanitarian intervention grounds. This is largely in line, at least to the administration's mind, with Walzer's notion that "humanitarian intervention is justified when it is a response (with reasonable expectations of success) to acts "that shock the moral conscience of mankind" (107). The Bush administration painted (and still paints) Saddam's regime as one that fit this description to a tee, and therefore was completely morally justified. Others, again, have disagreed.
It is somewhat frustrating that Walzer's 'definitions' leave room for both sides of the Iraq debate--that the administration can (in their mind) be fully justified in both anticipation and intervention while the administration critics say exactly the opposite. Part of the problem with Walzer is that, since he doesn't address foundations of morality and epistomology, it is hard to know who has the definitive word on what is/isn't a just war (cf. Dresden, fire bombing of).
The first thing that strikes me is Walzer's distinction between prevention and pre-emption (see also: Gaddis, Surprise, Security, and the American Experience (2004)). For Walzer, the difference lies in the imminence of an enemy's capability to attack and disrupt--preventive wars are fought to prevent a state from achieving the capabilities to attack in the future, pre-emptive wars are fought to disrupt an imminent attack. He argues (p. 80) that 'merely' preventive wars are unjustified, but that pre-emptive wars might be (depending on how "sufficient" the threat is [p. 81]).
So the question then becomes, "How do we characterize the 2003 invasion--as a preventive or pre-emptive war?" Most people/practitioners/scholars (Walzer included) would likely argue that it was preventive--Iraq didn't have imminent attack capabilities. The Bush administration argued, and still does/would, that the threat was much more imminent, and that it was thus a pre-emptive strike. The administration would argue that Iraq fit into Walzer's three criteria that satisfy a "sufficient threat,", namely "a manifest intent to injure, a degree of active preparation that makes that intent a positive danger, and a general situation in which waiting, or doing anything other than fighting, greatly magnifies the risk" (81).
What is particularly interesting to me is that, over the course of the three-year U.S. occupation [sic] of Iraq, and particularly in light of the fact that no WMD have been found, the Bush administration's primary justification for the invasion has shifted from pre-emption to intervention. The (nearly exclusive) line now is, "We needed to intervene to dethrone that horrible tyrant and establish democracy in Iraq." They are arguing on humanitarian intervention grounds. This is largely in line, at least to the administration's mind, with Walzer's notion that "humanitarian intervention is justified when it is a response (with reasonable expectations of success) to acts "that shock the moral conscience of mankind" (107). The Bush administration painted (and still paints) Saddam's regime as one that fit this description to a tee, and therefore was completely morally justified. Others, again, have disagreed.
It is somewhat frustrating that Walzer's 'definitions' leave room for both sides of the Iraq debate--that the administration can (in their mind) be fully justified in both anticipation and intervention while the administration critics say exactly the opposite. Part of the problem with Walzer is that, since he doesn't address foundations of morality and epistomology, it is hard to know who has the definitive word on what is/isn't a just war (cf. Dresden, fire bombing of).
posted by Kyle at 2:30 PM
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