Walzer pre-class

In light of the perennial contemporary debate over the 2003 invasion of Iraq by the U.S. military, chapters 5 & 6 (on anticipation and intervention respectively) provide for interesting reflection.

The first thing that strikes me is Walzer's distinction between prevention and pre-emption (see also: Gaddis, Surprise, Security, and the American Experience (2004)). For Walzer, the difference lies in the imminence of an enemy's capability to attack and disrupt--preventive wars are fought to prevent a state from achieving the capabilities to attack in the future, pre-emptive wars are fought to disrupt an imminent attack. He argues (p. 80) that 'merely' preventive wars are unjustified, but that pre-emptive wars might be (depending on how "sufficient" the threat is [p. 81]).

So the question then becomes, "How do we characterize the 2003 invasion--as a preventive or pre-emptive war?" Most people/practitioners/scholars (Walzer included) would likely argue that it was preventive--Iraq didn't have imminent attack capabilities. The Bush administration argued, and still does/would, that the threat was much more imminent, and that it was thus a pre-emptive strike. The administration would argue that Iraq fit into Walzer's three criteria that satisfy a "sufficient threat,", namely "a manifest intent to injure, a degree of active preparation that makes that intent a positive danger, and a general situation in which waiting, or doing anything other than fighting, greatly magnifies the risk" (81).

What is particularly interesting to me is that, over the course of the three-year U.S. occupation [sic] of Iraq, and particularly in light of the fact that no WMD have been found, the Bush administration's primary justification for the invasion has shifted from pre-emption to intervention. The (nearly exclusive) line now is, "We needed to intervene to dethrone that horrible tyrant and establish democracy in Iraq." They are arguing on humanitarian intervention grounds. This is largely in line, at least to the administration's mind, with Walzer's notion that "humanitarian intervention is justified when it is a response (with reasonable expectations of success) to acts "that shock the moral conscience of mankind" (107). The Bush administration painted (and still paints) Saddam's regime as one that fit this description to a tee, and therefore was completely morally justified. Others, again, have disagreed.

It is somewhat frustrating that Walzer's 'definitions' leave room for both sides of the Iraq debate--that the administration can (in their mind) be fully justified in both anticipation and intervention while the administration critics say exactly the opposite. Part of the problem with Walzer is that, since he doesn't address foundations of morality and epistomology, it is hard to know who has the definitive word on what is/isn't a just war (cf. Dresden, fire bombing of).

H. Bull Reflection

As Christine , Elisabeth and Jesse have already spent quite a bit of time digesting the 'order v. justice' problem (and making quite lucid arguments), I figured I'd venture to a different part of our Thursday night discussion: whether or not there can be multiple international societies within an international system, and how we might recognize an international society.

First, it is helpful to recall Bull's definition of an international society (or society of states). From page 13:

A society of states (or international society) exists when a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the working of of common institutions.

A problem, as uncovered in the class discussion, is that Bull doesn't specify whether this definition only allows for one over-arching international society or multiple international societies, and whether a state can belong to more than one international society. It seems to me, much like Monica and Christine, that the definition does allow for multiple international societies. Theoretically (and in practice) there are multiple 'groups of states' who 'conceive themselves bound by a common set of rules' and 'share in the working of common institutions.' One need not look beyond NAFTA and the EU to find two such examples of 'international society' as conceived by Bull.

Bull seems to argue toward the end (starting on p.294) that regional organizations are part of reforming the international system--that they would be separate from international society. To my mind, though, he doesn't really establish a rock-solid argument differentiating regional organizations from international societies.

So, if there are multiple international societies, could states belong to more than one international society? I would say yes, primarily because the UN is an international society par excellence, and the US, for example, is part of NAFTA and the UN. It seems to make sense that there are more limited international societies (eg. EU, NAFTA, ASEAN) and 'macro' international societies (eg. UN, WTO), and that states can be part of multiple international societies. Though this also begs the question of when a bunch of more limited international societies form a de facto 'macro' international society.

As an unrelated aside, I think in class Christine expressed what is perhaps the primary frustration for all of us with Bull's 'order v. justice' discussion: he leaves so much un-touched-upon, and seems to throw the chapter in to in some ways pay lip service to a criticism that was likely to arise. It is really too bad that he didn't live to write the corollary to this volume.