13 October 2006

Post-class: Kant

There are three things from last night's discussion that I'd like to briefly touch on.

First, we seemed to come to a roadblock when asked why Kant doesn't stop his analysis at the level of the state--how does he know that there's something beyond the level of states? In looking through the text, I came upon this:

Human nature never seems less lovable than in the relations among entire peoples. No nation's independence or possessions are even momentarily safe from others. The will to subjugate or to curtail the growth of others is always present, and the preparation for defense that often makes peace more oppressive and destructive of internal welfare than even war can never be relaxed. Now the sole possible remedy for this is a [state] of international right (analogous to the civil or national rights of individual men) based on public laws backed by force and submitted to by every nation. (89)
Kant seems, to me, to be arguing that the analysis must necessarily move beyond the state because there will invariably be interactions between the state. These interactions, in their natural manifestation, lead to war, for which the only remedy is international right. To my mind, Kant argues that interactions between states are an inevitability, whether it be war or peace (though we must undoubtedly pursue peace), and we therefore must include an international level in our analysis.

Second, Kant's emphasis on the need to pay lip-service to public right and duty (p. 131) seems to have some (perhaps limited) Machiavellian underpinnings. For Machiavelli, it may be more prudent for a Prince to give lip service to virtu, but he need not necessarily exhibit virtu. For Kant, even though it may be lamentable that men say one thing and do another, if 'all due honor' is given to the concept of public right, progress can still happen. This is where the two diverge, as Machiavelli doesn't argue that man moves toward virtu simply by giving the concept "all due honor."

Third, Kant's notion of 'one religion but many faiths and books' (p. 125-fn) doesn't hold, for me. My primary question regards what Kant actually means by 'religion'. I can't quite place it (and if you've got insight, have at it). Is he talking of monotheistic religions? Doctrine? If he is, all three monotheistic religions come from the same source, but doctrine is fundamentally at odds between them. There's this whole thing about Jesus with which Judaism and Islam just can't reconcile. Also, the doctrine of the trinity. I think there's a lot of ambiguity in this little footnote, and I wish he would have elaborated (perhaps he did in another place?).

11 October 2006

Pre-class: Kant

Nevertheless, from the throne of its moral legislative power, reason absolutely condemns war as a means of determining the right and makes seeking the state of peace a matter of unmitigated duty. (116)
This seems, to me, to be the essence of Kant's argument as to why a perpetual peace is not only possible, but, through progress of mankind, probable. The understanding of this quote (and Kant's theory of perpetual peace) is guided substantially by the understanding of Kant's views on the nature of duty.

For Kant, duty and morality are effectively twin hoods. He defines morality as "a science that teaches, not how we can be happy, but how we ought to become worthy of happiness" (63). He then paints duty as striving toward the highest good possible, which is "the purest morality throughout the world combined with such universal happiness as accords with it" (64). So, it is our obligation to strive after those things that are morally right (as defined by Reason)--the grand 'Ought' which is so often referenced. And, since humans are rational, they understand duty, and therefore are obligated to follow it--to shirk that duty would be irrational.

Also key in Kant's argument for perpetual peace is his argument that humans are progressing toward the highest good as history progresses. "I will thus permit myself to assume that since the human race's natural end is to make steady cultural progress, its moral end is to be conceived as progressing toward the better" (86). If humans were not progressing morally, there would be no chance of attaining a peaceful federation of states.
In light of this, then, the beginning quote and the unpacking of Kant's argument can be understood as follows (I hope I'm right (please comment judiciously if I'm not)): Because men are rational creatures that understand duty, and because mankind is progressing toward the highest good, when men gather together and participate in a republican government, they will inevitably fulfill their duty to pursue peace with other nations, and all republican nations will act in kind.

A couple of quick thoughts:

My Judeo-Christian worldview is drenched in the idea that, yes there is a highest good (sinlessness), and, yes, one should pursue that highest good, but ultimately one will not--indeed cannot--reach that highest good. Having Kant tell us that one actually can attain the highest good is a bit of a jolt.

Kant's qualifications for citizenship (p. 76) are a bit jarring to modern sensibilities.