Post-discussion reflections on Hobbes

I am quite vigorously wrestling with Hobbes' notion of good and evil. He appears to be arguing that man calls that toward which he is drawn good, and that from which he recoils evil (p. 32). This strikes me as a fairly revolutionary notion of good and evil in the scheme of Western (and, particularly Christian) thought.

Previously, good and evil were seen as characteristics possessed, rather than characteristics imputed by an observer. This likely has everything to do with Hobbes' notion that one can't know the universal law, but it still seems rather unconventional.

There also seem, to me, to be inconsistencies later on in the text. In writing about how big and powerful God is, and how a ruler should disobey at his own peril (lest the Sovereign rot in Hell) (p. 182), there's the implication that there's a good to enact in obedience, and an evil to enact in disobedience. Perhaps Hobbes would argue that eternity is different from the temporal, but there seems to be a disconnect here. "You should do what you know to be in order to avoid eternal damnation," he seems to say. Doesn't that imply that there is a body (of whatever size) of actions/things/qualities that are universally known to be good or evil (in the traditionally-conceived, Aristotelian sense of the concepts)?

I think there's some significance to Hobbes' implication of the linguistic relativity of good and evil. Look, for example, at the current debate throughout the world over what constitutes the evil of 'terrorism.' More specifically, some would call 9/11 a good thing, and some would call it pure evil. Hobbes is right that they can be used in a relative sense linguistically, but, as I said, I still question his whole notion of good and evil.

Pre-class: Hobbes

In the lecturelet, PTJ proposed that we pay attention to why Hobbes begins Leviathan (as it occurs in the version we’re reading) with so much attention to definitions. I think Hobbes, himself, speaks to that pretty directly in a couple of places. He first argues that it is imperative that one understands what one is talking about. This can be applied to the aggregate, as well, in that there must be a common definition among people in order to foster understanding.

Seeing then that truth consisteth in the right ordering of names in our affirmations, a man that seeketh precise truth, had need to remember what every name he uses stands for; and to place it accordingly; or else he will find himselfe entangled in words, as a bird in lime-twiggs; the more he struggles, the more belimed. (22)

A little later on, his reasons for beginning with definitions becomes even clearer. He argues that, unless definitions are clear, and a clear logical path is followed, one can’t take an argument as fact. This, to me, seems to be the reason why he so painstakingly lays out definitions—he wants his account to be taken as fact.

And therefore, when the Discourse is put into Speech, and begins with the Definitions of Words, and proceeds by Connexion of the same into generall Affirmations, and of these again into Syllogismes; the End or last summe is called the Conclusion; and the thought of the mind by it signified, is that conditionall Knowledge, or Knowledge of the consequence of words, which is commenly called Science. But if the first ground of such Discourse, be not Definitions; or if the Definitions be not rightly joyned together into Syllogismes, then the End or Conclusion, is again Opinion, namely of the truth of somewhat said, though sometimes in absurd and senselsse words, without possibility of being understood. (38)

So does Hobbes’ ‘definitions’ project accomplish its goal? If he didn’t set out to define things so exhaustively, would the account still be as authoritative/respected? I think that his ‘definitions’ project is rather important; it allows the reader to understand just how he reaches his conclusions about why a commonwealth is even necessary. It also gives the reader a better understanding of what he means when he talks of covenants, etc.

Some food for thought:

• Does an Augustinian view of human nature (that man is corrupt/sinful) necessarily lead to a Hobbesian need for a commonwealth?

• Hobbes defines power (p. 48) as “his present means to obtain some future apparent Good.” Would Thucydides and/or Machiavelli agree?

• Are Hobbes’ definitions of justice and injustice (p. 79) sufficient? Are the two only related to the fulfillment or neglect of a covenant?