30 September 2006

Post-class: Locke

Locke’s notion of ‘government as means’ is, I think, an important one to consider. (Christine gives it some thought here). I think he’s right that government is only a means (albeit a very important means) to an end (for Locke, life, liberty, and property). We don’t contract into political society as an end unto itself—government for government’s sake. We contract into political society so that something might be improved upon—that government might provide something that we can’t provide for ourselves.

To transport the argument a bit, what is the end that modern Americans are pursuing, and how is government a means for those ends? I would posit that modern Americans are pursuing the very same things that they have been pursuing since America’s inception—life, liberty, property, and the pursuit of happiness (it would be interesting, at some point, to unpack what Locke, Jefferson, et. al. meant by ‘life’). We want to know what’s going to lead us to the ‘good life’.

Government serves as a very useful means for those ends. It enacts laws to protect our property (both individual property and the country as a whole), it implements policies that enhance our well-being (to varying degrees of success), it provides aid in dire situations (again, sadly, to varying degrees of success). I tend to agree with the more Lockeian notion of limited government, as many of one’s ends are attainable through individual (or at least sub-governmental) pursuits. Nonetheless, as I said, government is a very useful means.

On a slightly different note, I think that Locke would have viewed the Jeffersonian notion of 'pursuit of happiness' as suspect. It seems, to me, that he would have argued that it's too intangible—that property is much more worthwhile (and, frankly, attainable) as an end. Also, I think that he would argue that, beyond property, happiness is superfluous.

A question that’s been rolling around my head for the past couple days: What would Locke think of the modern welfare state? I don't have an answer just yet, but it's food for thought.

27 September 2006

Pre-class: Locke

My colleague and I are thinking along the same lines prior to Thursday's class. Would the logic of Locke's argument still hold if God were taken out of the equation? Well, I would have to answer "probably so" and "definitely not," depending on whether or not something replaces God in the equation.

If the logic of Locke's argument were to hold without the presence of God, one would need something to replace God in the equation. One could argue that humans are all equal based on secular grounds, and the logic could, it seems to me, still stand up. People argue for inalienable human rights on non-religious grounds quite often today. From there forward, one still obtains property the same way, still sets up society in the same way, and so on and so forth. While God is mentioned much more in Locke's argument than in Hobbes', God still seems to be passive beyond establishing the state of nature and endowing men with the natural law.

If one were to simply take God out of the equation without replacing it, I think the logic falls apart. Without some justification for the equality of all mankind, there's no reason to agree that political society is based on consent of the governed. If men aren't equal, who cares whether consent is given or not. Without the equality of all mankind as a basis, doesn't it just become about who has the most power?

The basis for Locke's argument that all people are equal as to the law of nature, as I see it, lies in the notion of imago dei. The notion posits that all people are equal because all are created in the image of God. Locke writes:

And Reason, which is that Law [of Nature], teaches all Mankind, who will but consult it, that being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his Life, Health, Liberty, or Possessions. For Men being all the Workmanship of one Omnipotent, and infinitely wise Maker; All the Servants of one Sovereign Master, sent into the World by his order and about his business, they are his property, whose Workmanship they are, made to last during his, not one anothers Pleasure. (271)

Without the notion of imago dei, (or some similar basis that's non-religious), I don't think one can proceed to argue on Lockean grounds. It's all about equality, and the rights of people and necessity of consent because they're equal.

A couple ancillary thoughts:

  • Locke spends a lot of time arguing for the supremacy of the legislative branch (Ch XIII) over the executive. This raises two questions: 1) Would Locke like the way America's social contract was formed? 2) Would Locke agree or disagree with how the relationship between the two branches has evolved over time?
  • Locke clearly argues that it's okay (and perhaps even necessary) to revolt (396-397). Perhaps this stems from the idea that Locke's contract is a two-way proposition, where Hobbes' was only one-way.