Pre-class: Weber

Pre-class: Weber


I'm finding Weber's final amalgamation of the two types of ethics--conviction and responsibility--quite interesting (if not a trifle confusing). I'm going to just 'talk' it out and see what happens. He introduces the two types as such:

We need to be clear that all ethically oriented action can be guided by either of two fundamentally different, irredeemably incompatible maxims: it can be guided by an "ethics of conviction" or an "ethics of responsibility"...In the former case this means, to put it in religious terms: "A Christian does what is right and leaves the outcome to God," while in the latter you must answer for the (foreseeable) consequences of your actions. (83)

As the bolded text above indicates (almost, though not entirely, exhausting the thesaurus), Weber doesn't think the two types of ethics can meet. He then proceeds to make that case. He argues that "ethics of conviction" don't bother with responsibility, which is anathema to the reasonable assessment of ethical conduct. The (relative!) 'goodness' of an end doesn't always justify the means--in this case use of force. He places within "ethics of responsibility" that ethical conduct which takes the consequences of actions into account, and acts accordingly. He continues to develop the distinction between the two types over the next few pages.

Then, in what seems a reversal, he argues that the two types are actually mutually complementary in some instances (eg. Luther: "Here I stand, I can do no other"). He says:

In this sense an ethics of conviction and an ethics of responsibility are not absolute antitheses but are mutually complementary, and only when taken together do they constitute the authentic human being who is capable of having a "vocation for politics." (92)

So, if I read this right (and please set me straight if I didn't), Weber is arguing that, in order to be capable of having a "vocation for politics," one needs to understand (and mind) the consequences and act based on the firm conviction (in the sense that he talks of passion in Science as a Vocation? (p. 8)) of what is 'right.' A man who acts thusly is a man Weber can respect and approve of ethically. So is it all about the awareness of and attention to consequences? Would Weber argue that a religious war (justified by "ethics of conviction") is wrong until they understand, and are willing to accept, the consequences? If they do this, are they then ethically 'okay' for Weber? (Am I totally off base?) Admittedly, this is still a thought process.

A couple of passing thoughts:

• At the end of Science as a Vocation, Weber talks about the "daemon that holds the thread of [a man's] life," (31) and seems to imply that it is 'moral' to pursue one's vocation. Is it immoral to not follow one's vocation, in Weber's view? I think he would argue that it's damn hard to ignore a vocation in the beruf-ian sense that he implies. Just a thought.
• I may be way off, but I detect a basis for much of Prof PTJ's philosophy of education within Science as a Vocation (particularly 20-25).
• On a lighter note, I think Weber hits it right on the nose when he says that someone pursuing an academic career "must be properly qualified not only as a scholar, but also as a teacher. And these two things are by no means identical" (5). You know what he's talking about.
  

Modern 'crisis'?

In the lecture podcast, Prof Jackson raised the question of whether we are currently in a similar ‘crisis’ to that which Carr describes. First, I think it is important to unpack what Carr sees as the crisis. On page 217 (Cox edition), he writes:

It is, however, useless to discuss these problems of power and morality in a nineteenth-century setting, as if some fortunate turn of the wheel could restore the old conditions and allow a reconstitution of the international order on something like the old lines. The real international crisis of the modern world is the final and irrevocable breakdown of the conditions which made the nineteenth-century order possible. The old order cannot be restored, and a drastic change of outlook is unavoidable.

On page 218 (Cox edition), Carr writes:

There may be other obstacles to the establishment of a new international order. But failure to recognize the fundamental character of the conflict, and the radical nature of the measures necessary to meet it, is certainly one of them.

So, as we discussed a bit in class, Carr is arguing that the ‘crisis’ of which he speaks is one of misunderstanding the international order—employing a 19th century mindset in analysis of the 20th century. He argues that the breakdown of the international order during the inter-war years was due to an improper post-WWI peace set up by the victors who paid far too much heed to the 19th century international order.

I think that there is, at least in part, a current ‘crisis’ of a similar kind in the interational system. After the fall of the Soviet Union, the bi-polar view of the international order ceased to exist not only as a reality, but also as a useful analytical tool. There was a need, therefore, for a better tool for analyzing and understanding the world. Though efforts have been made to this end (cf. Fukuyama, Huntington, et. al.), it seems as though these efforts remain unfinished, thus producing some misunderstanding about the international order.

This problem of misunderstanding/misdiagnosis has been prevalent in some of the US foreign policy decisions of the past five years (and probably in the previous decade, too). Many of the chief policymakers of the current Bush administration cut their foreign policy teeth in the Cold War, and that kind of mindset maintains influence today (cf. Manichaean/Dualistic view of the world, continued reliance on a global ‘balance of powers’ etc.).

Perhaps I am wrong in my assessment, but it seems as though there is a ‘crisis’ of misunderstanding much like Carr and his contemporaries experienced (though this ‘crisis’ seems to have ebbed since its initial outbreak). Carr’s recommendation: examine the realities of the international system and make sound academic analysis and policy decisions based on that reality. Also, make sure that those who practice foreign policy understand the nature of the world in which they live.