H. Bull - Pre-Class
In lieu of assessing the overall efficacy of Bull's work today, I'd like to look at his notion of great powers.
Bull argues at the beginning of Ch. 9 that the notion of great powers implies 1) "that there are two or more powers that are comparable in status," 2) "that members of this [great powers] club are all in front rank in terms of military strength," and 3) that "great powers are powers recognized by others to have, and conceived by their own leaders and peoples to have, certain special rights and duties (194-196). In light of these criteria, he singles out the US, the USSR and (mostly) China as the great powers of the day.
A disagreement I have with his criteria is that a state's economic strength (or weight) (or lack thereof) seems to be missing as a descriptive criterion. Though one could argue over whether military or economic strength means more to a state's standing in the international society, the latter is most definitely an important factor. I suppose the counterargument to my disagreement could be that 'front rank in terms of military strength' implies a strong economy (or great economic weight)--a state could hardly have a strong military if it did not also have a strong/weighty economy. But this leaves out states like Japan and new entities like the EU. If not for its vibrant economic growth of the second half of the 20th Century, Japan would rarely be considered even a candidate for the mantel of great power. Why does Bull leave this out?
One must also, in 2006, assess whether the notion of great powers is still valid. The US seems, to me, to be a hyperpower among the great powers of the EU, Japan, China, Russia(?) and, ever-increasingly, India. But here, again, one runs into the problem of Bull's criteria. I don't think the EU and Japan would make the cut today by Bull's standards.
A side note:
It is interesting to read Bull's musings about the diminution of the 'diplomatist' skill among diplomats in light of the fact that some ambassadorial posts arepayola posts posts that require less of a diplomatist's acumen.
Bull argues at the beginning of Ch. 9 that the notion of great powers implies 1) "that there are two or more powers that are comparable in status," 2) "that members of this [great powers] club are all in front rank in terms of military strength," and 3) that "great powers are powers recognized by others to have, and conceived by their own leaders and peoples to have, certain special rights and duties (194-196). In light of these criteria, he singles out the US, the USSR and (mostly) China as the great powers of the day.
A disagreement I have with his criteria is that a state's economic strength (or weight) (or lack thereof) seems to be missing as a descriptive criterion. Though one could argue over whether military or economic strength means more to a state's standing in the international society, the latter is most definitely an important factor. I suppose the counterargument to my disagreement could be that 'front rank in terms of military strength' implies a strong economy (or great economic weight)--a state could hardly have a strong military if it did not also have a strong/weighty economy. But this leaves out states like Japan and new entities like the EU. If not for its vibrant economic growth of the second half of the 20th Century, Japan would rarely be considered even a candidate for the mantel of great power. Why does Bull leave this out?
One must also, in 2006, assess whether the notion of great powers is still valid. The US seems, to me, to be a hyperpower among the great powers of the EU, Japan, China, Russia(?) and, ever-increasingly, India. But here, again, one runs into the problem of Bull's criteria. I don't think the EU and Japan would make the cut today by Bull's standards.
A side note:
It is interesting to read Bull's musings about the diminution of the 'diplomatist' skill among diplomats in light of the fact that some ambassadorial posts are
posted by Kyle at 3:09 PM
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