Pre-class: Waltz

In the lecturelet on Waltz, Prof. PTJ asks whether one really needs all three images to explain the occurrence of war. Waltz would certainly argue that one does need all three images for analysis, and I would tend to agree with him (though I think there is a need to add non-state actors to the analysis). I think his argument on this front is summed up when he writes:

The third image describes the framework of world politics, but without the first and second images there can be no knowledge of the forces that determine policy; the first and second images describe the forces in world politics, but without the third image it is impossible to assess their importance or predict their results. (238)

Waltz argues that, if one were to analyze through only the first or second images, one could only get so far in the analysis. Yes, the immediate causes of war are found in the first and second images, but one's analysis has various implications depending on the framework of the international system (ie. it's anarchical nature according to Waltz). Likewise, one finds the permissive cause of war in the third image, but very little hope of ferreting out the immediate cause.

I tend to agree with Waltz that all three images are necessary for analysis. Without all three images, one runs the risk of missing the mark in analysis, especially if one is only analyzing from the third image--what are the immediate causes if not from men or the state? As Waltz so aptly says, "The prescriptions directly derived from a single image are incomplete because they are based upon partial analyses" (230). Also important is that all three images are useful--using only the first and the third image, or the second and third (I would argue that the third, as the framework, is a necessary component of the analysis) would leave holes.

Post-class: Weber

Apologies for the inordinate lateness of this post. I wanted to look into one of the questions we discussed in class: "Is Politics as a Vocation scientific?"

For Weber, science does two things 1) it "gives us knowledge of the techniques whereby we can control life through calculation" and 2) it "provides methods of thought, the tools of the trade, and the training needed to make use of them." (25). Also, a scientist (in this case a teacher) is in the business of putting forth uncomfortable ideas about a subject matter that stretch the reader's or hearer's intellect. (22)

I think, by these three measures, Politics as a Vocation (PV) is scientific in the second and third instances, but not really in the first. PV doesn't provide a whole lot of advice on "techniques whereby we can control life through calculation." I have a bit of a hard time with this one more generally, because I'm not quite sure what Weber means by controlling life "through calculation." Does he mean analysis through statistics and other similar methods? Also, can we really "control" politics? I'm a bit confused. One could argue that his discussion of the party boss is a manual for acquiring votes for a particular party, but I don't think this really relates to techniques for controlling life through calculation.

With regard to the second criterion, I think PV is quite scientific. Weber spends time a good deal of time talking about some of the philosophical and practical underpinnings of political life (ie. justification of power, political parties, ethical moorings, etc.). He also spends time talking about what one needs in order to be good at politics. The whole thing is really, as Prof PTJ said, a response to the question "So you want to be a politician?"

I think that PV meets the "science" bar on the third criterion as well. Most notable among the uncomfortable ideas is the idea that one can't objectively judge the value of German vs. French culture. I think Weber's views on ethics of conviction and ethics of responsibility are uncomfortable too--we don't want to be told that politics of conviction (no matter what the issue) is a bad way to approach politics.

Perhaps most importantly, PV isn't political, as Weber doesn't argue in favor of certain policies or political parties or agendas. He specifically states up front that the lecture is going to be about the vocation, and not about who has the right policies. This, I think, stems directly from his view of a professor's role in Science as a Vocation, which is that a professor is there not to lead students, but to teach them--presenting facts and allowing them to think for themselves (21-24). I think it's quite admirable, in fact, that he doesn't turn it into a markedly 'political' lecture.

On a separate note, I find it interesting to read Weber's account of the lack of ethics of responsibility on an inter-state level (80). He never says,"We got creamed at Versailles and this was absolutely irresponsible ethically," but that seems to be the implication and backdrop for his disgust with the lack of "dignity" with which the settlement was reached.